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PYQ 1200 Q/A Part - 1
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Kerala PSC Indian History Book Study Materials Page 2134
Book's First Pageroad, leaving the Chinese with the option of cutting through the harsh Takla Makan desert–not the most favorable terrain. The PRC decided to take the shortcut through Indian territory rather than the desert route. Taking advantage of the historical quirk that they had not actually signed the agreement at the Simla Conference, China published maps showing that Aksai Chin belonged to them, and refused the de-facto McMahon line, in the East of India, that demarcated the border and control of the land. In October 1958 the road was discovered, creating a flurry of diplomatic messages from both sides, chastising the other for their territorial transgressions. When the public came to know about the Chinese roads, Nehru was faced with increasingly vocal criticism in the Indian Parliament, and he once angrily asked his critics whether they wanted him to go to war on this issue. Before these border incidents, Nehru recommended that the Indian and Chinese governments sift through historical evidence and recommend where the border should be. Chou en-Lai’s suggestion, made ‘On November 7, 1959, was to complete demilitarise the entire border to a depth of 20 km, using the McMahon line in the East and the “line of actual control” in the West. This would effectively have jeopardised India’s defensive positions in the East, while legitimising Peking’s land grab in the West. Essentially, China wanted a solution based on military and strategic positions, while India wanted only a strict adherence to boundaries that had been agreed upon for between the last forty and two hundred years. Tensions increased further following India’s warm welcome to the Dalai Lama, who, crossed into India with 20,000 followers in March 1959. Mao felt it was a loss of face, and that China “needed a victory in some sphere.” The Chinese claim of NEFA was thus voiced in the aftermath of the 1959 Tibetan revolt. In 1959, at a meeting between Nehru and China’s foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, both countries agreed not to send patrols within two miles of the McMahon Line in NEFA. However, On August 7, 1959, about 200 Chinese troops intruded into the Indian border at Khenzemane in the Kameng frontier division at east of Thagla Ridge. When challenged by the Indian patrol and asked to withdraw, they pushed the Indian party consisting of 10 men to the bridge at Drokung Samba. China considered the sector as within Chinese