perhaps to 1937, perhaps to 1934, to 1920, to 1919 or even to the days of Sir
Sayyid. The events of these years may have been significant milestones but
they did not inevitably lead to Pakistan. Nor indeed did the Lahore
Resolution itself inexorably foreshadow the formation of an Islamic state. In
1940 the Pakistan demand seemed somewhat quixotic, an unreal objective. It
was still not widely accepted seriously even by Muslim intellectuals and
leaders, much less by the middle class or by the masses. Some writers have
interpreted the formulation of the demand not as a serious objective but rather
as a bargaining point which the League could use to exact the maximum
concessions from any future constitutional settlement. If so, then even after
1940, Pakistan was not inevitable and it does seem that Jinnah was prepared
at certain later stages to accept something significantly less than Pakistan.
The issue as a whole provides one of the major controversies in South Asian
C R Formula (1944)
C. Rajagopalachari, realising the necessity of a settlement between the
Congress and the Muslim League for the attainment of independence by
India, evolved in 1944, a formula, called the C R Formula. Its main contents
    • The Muslim League should cooperate with the Congress in the
        formation of provisional interim government for the transitional
    • After the close of war, a commission shall be appointed to demarcate
        the boundaries of the Muslim-dominated districts in the north-west
        and east of India. The people of these districts shall decide, by
        plebiscite, the issue of separation from India. ‘
    • In the event of separation, a mutual agreement shall be entered into
        between the two governments for jointly safeguarding defence,
        commerce, communications        and other essential sectors, etc.